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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SUE LACY OLSEN, 
Plaintiff, Respondent 
SCT 111 7040 
vs. 
REED J. OLSEN, Civil No. 17377 
;. Defendant, Appellant 
BRIEF OF. APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
. 
This is an appeal from a Memorandum Decision and Order 
signed April 24, 1978 denying Appellant's Motion for a New 
Trial; and is also an appeal of the Decree of Divorce entered 
March 26, 1980 in the First Judicial District Court of Cache 
County, State of Utah, by the Honorable Ted S. Perry, District 
Court Judge pro tern. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks an equitable result reforming or remanding 
the District Court's judgment concerning distribution of the 
property. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff's Complaint for divorce was filed September 1, 1978 
seeking divorce, alimony, payment of debts, temporary 
support, and the distribution of the parties' residence and 
furniture with the proceeds divided between the parties, in 
1 
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an "equitable" division of the property "taking into consideration 
each parties' (sic) contribution towards the purchase of 
said property.'' The parties were married in Elko, Nevada 
April 14, 1976, both having been previously married and 
divorced and having children by their previous spouses. The 
Plaintiff had been married more than one other time. Two 
of Plaintiff's children and none of Defendant's children 
resided with the parties. 
! That Plaintiff obtained a restraining order at the 
time of filing the Complaint, but did not serve it or the 
Complaint on the Defendant and thereafter reconciled with 
the Defendant. Some six months thereafter, she left the 
residence and went to live with her mother and sought an 
O~der ordering Defendant out of the residence. The Order 
only was served on Defendant. Neither the Complaint nor the 
Summons were served. 
In responding to the Order to Show Cause, Defendant 
alleged Plaintiff left of her own volition, that he had not 
received a copy of the Complaint and that it would not be 
equitable to require him to leave the dwelling in which he 
was living and where he was making the payments. An order 
to vacate the Order to Show Cause insofar as it required 
th.e Defendant to leave the premises, based on Defendant's 
affidavit, was entered ,in March of 1979 prior to a hearing. 
The Court entered a temporary order after hearing at 
which both parties were represented with counsel and required 
the ·Defendant to maintain the resi.dence and the property 
acquired by the parties during the marriage nntil the 
matter was tried or the parties negotiated a property settlement, 
allowing the Plaintiff to retrieve any personal eff0 ~ts 
owned prior to the marriage of the parties, requir Ln.'~ the 
payment of temporary support money to be taken intn consider:ation 
2 
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~ 
at final resolution of the case, holding in abeyance the 
matter of attorney's fees, requiring Defendant to pay debts 
and obligations of the partie~ incurred during the marriage, 
and to maintain the monthly opligations on the premises and 
requiring the Plaintiff to ma~e payments on the Alpha Romeo 
automobile in the event she obtained possession because she 
had no other transportation. The automobile was jointly 
owned. 
Thereafter, the parties had at least one additional 
~~conciliation in which they lived together but later separated. 
Correspondence flowed between the attorneys representing the 
respective parties in which the sole issue was a matter of 
distribution of the residence, the automobile and personal 
property of the parties. The proposals became quite detailed 
but the parties were unable to agree or resolve their differences. 
October 3, 1979 Plaintiff submitted Interrogatories to 
Defendant9 Plaintiff moved to compel answers in November of 
1979. Defendant's answers were filed December 6, 1979. 
December 12 Plaintiff requested a trial setting. December 
18 the ~ourt said the case would be· set after appropriate 
rules had been followed. December 21, the Court set the 
matter for trial after Plaintiff and Defendant had agreed at 
the hearing on the 19th of December, 1979 that a trial day 
setting could be made provided Defendant could continue 
discovery through the time of trial. The trial was set for 
March 7 as a second setting anp August 26, 1980 as a first 
setting. Plaintiff finally an~wered Defendant's Interrogatories 
February 21. february 29, the parties were advised that the 
second setting would become a first setting, and Defendant 
objected to the trial setting because of the need for additional 
discovery. A continuance was granted without allowing 
Defendant's counsel to get to the hastily called hearing, 
but only until March 13, 1980 making it impossible to pursue 
the additional discovery. Trial was held March 13, 1980 
3 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
without prior notice that a different judge (than had presided 
at the Show Cause hearing) was assigned to the case. 
Plaintiff's proposed form of Findings of ·Fact and 
Conclusions of Law were altered somewhat after Defendant 
objected to the form as not complying w'ith the actual findings, 
but were not altered to Defendant's satisfaction. The Court 
particularly refused to make a finding of the value of the 
real property as shown by the evidence believed by the Court 
at the trial; refused to make a finding of the amount of 
~oney each party put into the house at the time the property 
was bought and refused to reflect the evidence introduced at 
trial that Plaintiff had contributed $8,000.00 and Defendant 
had put in $28,118.26 towards the down payment of the house; 
or that in addition Defendant had contributed $60,523.88 and 
Plaintiff $7,728.13 to the marriage. The Court did consider 
that bank interest rates were high at the time and said he 
increased Plaintiff's equity to compensate, without any 
party having requested the same and without making specific 
findings. The Court further refused to require the Plaintiff 
to return property removed from the premises in Defendant's 
absence prior to the entry of the order. The interlineated 
findings and decree were entered March 26, 1980, without 
curing the Defendant's enumerated deficiencies and some 
others. 
During the course of the trial the Court refused the 
Defendant opportunity to introduce testimony of hL) version 
of the treatment between the parties, and found th-1t agreements 
not actually made between the parties regarding di8oosal of 
. . 
personal property were made; refused to accept the testimony 
of the Defendant relative to the value of the premis~s; 
refused to reflect in the jnd~~rncnt that- during the course of 
the marriage the Defendant had contributed some $88 ,642. 7lt-
to the house and living expenses whereas the Plaintiff had 
contributed $15,728.75; refused to consider in awar,.iing the 
4 
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personal property to the Plaintiff that he awarded all the 
outstanding debts that went with it to the Defendant; refused 
to consider that Defendant ha~ paid all the debts of the 
~ 
parties during the time pending divorce while they were 
separated except for Plaintiff's separate living expenses. 
The Court also failed to consider testimony by the Defendant 
of the extra cost of support experienced on Defendant's part 
by supporting Plaintiff's chiidren who lived in the house. 
In short, the Court did not p¢rmit·an oral.answer or defenses 
during trial or ignored Defendant's evidence and regarded 
the Defendant as if he had waived ~ny right to equitable 
considerations by the Court because not filing a formal 
written during the proceedings. The Coµrt made a finding 
that the Plaintiff was entitled to share in the increased 
value of the hoII)e off the top, and found the value to be 
- ' 
exactly what the Plaintiff said it was but did not apportion 
the "shar~" according to the amount of money contributed 
initially and as requested by the Complaint. The Court al~.o 
made a finding of the Plaintiff's income .which was not 
supported by evi~ence. The Court falsly found that the 
distribution of the personal property had been agreed to by 
the parties notwithstanding testimony from both parties as 
to the non-agree~ent. T~anscript, page 36 lines 3-17; page 
82 line 12 to page 93 line 5; page 113 line 18 to page 114 
line 6. The Court also found after having refused Defendant's 
testimony regarding incowe that~ nevertheless, Defendant 
should pay all the bills even ~hough the personal property 
was given to the Plaintiff for which many of the bills were 
in~ being paid. Finally, the Court refused to permit the Defendant 
to enter testimony regarding defenses to allegations Plaintiff 
' made that she had been subjected to mental or physical 
cruelty. The Court appeared to base its memorandum decision, 
denying the motion for a new trial, on Defendant's failure 
to file a formal answer notwithstanding the fact that he had 
never been served, appeared to neither give the Defendant 
equitable rights in conformance with the complaint (according 
5 
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to the contribution of each party) nor to give the Defendant 
opportunity to testify fully to make the evidence conform 
with his position. 
POINT I 
The Defendant has a right to present testimony at the 
trial and have it fully considered even though no formal 
written answer was ever filed. 
:.. "All aspects of proceedings in divorce matters are 
equitable." Iverson v. Iverson, 526 P2d 1126 (Utah 
1974) • 
This matter is in equity. It is believed that Rule 
8(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure does not demand a 
written answer and the only issue in this situation is the 
amount of damage: 
" ••. Averments in a pleading to which no response or 
pleading is required or permitted shall be taken as 
denied or avoided." U.R.C.P. Rule S(d) 
It is, therefore, asserted that Defendant should have 
had full consideration and right to testify as to the cruel 
treatment alleged by the Plaintiff in her Complaint. Defendant 
had considerable dealings with the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff's 
counsel and Rule 8(f) should be construed so as to do substantial 
justice for the Defendant who did not contest the right of 
the Plaintiff to seek divorce or division of property according 
to each party's contdbution, but only contested the amount 
of damages: 
'' •.• the prevailing rule of equity pleading is that 
allegat.ions of the bill are not to be deemed to have 
b1~er1 a'"lmitted simply because the statements are ignored 
by the answer. If the facts which the complainant has 
alleged are material to his case, they must be established 
by evidence." 27 Am Jur 2nd Sect. 202 
The remedy of the Complainant in the eveut the Defendant 
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i 
fails to file an answer is ordinarily to take a decree pro 
I 
confesso. The Plaintiff failed to do this and the Defendant 
vigorously resisted her restraining order and otherwise 
refused to play dead. Thus, the prevailing rule of equity 
rules in this situation and should be interpreted as the 
Defendant having denied all, the allegations that the Plaintiff 
made. 
"Generally, whenever interests of justice and· fair 'play 
will be served thereby, the trial court should exercise 
its discretion liberally in favor of giving the parties 
an opportunity for a hearing on the merits of the 
:. case." Barber v. Calder, 522 P2d 700 (Utah 1974). 
The Trial Court in this _situation should have used a 
liberal interpretation of the pleadings and considered the 
equity arguments in this situation so as to allow an opportunity 
for a hearing on the merits of the case. _This was ~ot 
complied with. Defendant was not given a fair opportunity 
to have his opinion considered in this situation. 
Even if the Defendant was deemed to have accepted the 
allegations in the Plaintiff's Complaint, no evidentiary 
facts were alleged in the Complaint. The Complaint asked 
for equity. This is all the ?efendant wants on appeal. 
"Whether the award of the division of property (in a 
divorce case) is unjust or inequitable must necessarily 
depend on the facts and circumstances of each particular 
case." Tsoufakis v. Tsoufakis, 382 P2d 412 (Utah 1963) 
Plaintiff's ~omplaint for divorce filed September l, 
1978 seeks divorce, alimony, payment of debts, temporary 
support, and the distribution ;iof the parties' residence and 
furniture with the proceeds divided between the parties, in 
an "equitable division of the property" taking into consideration 
each parties' (sic) contribution towards the purchase of the 
said property." Equity is a fact situation in each circumstance 
eJ and the Plaintiff's complaint wanted an equitable division 
of the property on terms the Defendant could accept, as 
stated in the complaint. He had contributed a lot more 
7 
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property to the marriage than had the Plaintiff, who introduced 
the rule of division she wanted in the complaint. The Trial 
I 
Court failed to do this. It granted the Plaintiff the 
possession of many items while requiring Defendant to pay 
the indebtedness on them. It granted Plaintiff an inequitable 
amount in the house, unjustified by the fact situation. 
Because the Olsen divorce is an equitable matter, and 
because the Court has failed to apply equity to the Olsen 
fact situation, the Supreme Court should modify or remand 
the judgment. 
POINT II 
The Trial Court erred in accepting the Pla~3tiff's 
unsupported estimate of the value of the house at $100,000. 
An owner of property may certainly testify ~s to its 
worth. The Supreme Court reasoned in Utah State Road Commission v. 
Johnson, 550 P2d 216 (Utah 1976) that the owner ~f real 
estate is not presumed adequately qualified to express an 
opinion of the market value by reason of his ownership 
alone. The Plaintiff in this situation was certainly entitled 
to express her opinion as to what the property value of the 
house was. The Defendant was equally entitled to his opinion. 
These opinions conflicted. The Plaintiff believed the house 
to be worth $100,000, while the Defendant thought the value 
of the home was around $85,000. Testimony of this type is 
not conclusive, even if not contradicted. Anderso!lY• .. $!.9-.r~ 
Farm Fit:~~!~~-· Casul~gg1_~~ 583 P2d 101 (Utah 197()). 
The Plaintiff and her counsel asked for an appraisal of 
the house. "I think that the house should be appraised and 
I think that the Defendant ought to be ordered to pay - _ return 
her inv~:1 stment plus give her a share of the appreciation on 
the house." Trial transcript page 137, lines 12 to 15. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
:e 
t~ 
Becaus·e 'the Plaintiff asked for an appraisal of the house 
and the Defendant felt it wa1s worth much less than the 
Plaintiff felt it was worth,: the Trial Court should have 
awarded an appraisal of the pouse before it divided or 
I 
decided what equity the Defepdant could derive therefrom. 
) 
"Notwithstanding the equitable powers of district court 
in interfamily controversies in divorce matters, and 
the acknowledged broad latitude of discretion allowed 
therein, the court cannot act arbitrarily, or on supposition 
or conj ectm:·e as to facts upon which to justify its 
order." Iverson v. Iverson, 526 P2d 1127 (Utah 1974) 
The District. Cdurt in tP,is, situation simply assumed the 
hous~ was worth $100 ,000 and: then ~wmehow determined that 
fact and granted the Plaintiff $15,000 equity therein to be 
paid off the top by the Defendant, or enforced as a lien, 
without any apparent regard fO who contributed what percentage 
of the supposed equity, selling commission, or Defendant's 
right to get a fair eq.uity o:tf the top. If the house it 
worth less, which the Defend~nt alleges, he has effectively 
lost a considerable amount_ot money because of the Trial 
Court's refusal to grant an ~ppraisal of the house. The 
Trial Court acted on supposi~ion ~nd conjecture when it 
assumed the house wa~ worth $100,000. 
When a judgment has so ~ailed to do equity that it 
{I 
manifests a clear abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court on 
review will take appropriate corrective action in the inteiest 
of justice. Waston v. Watson, 561 P2d 1072 (Utah 1977). In 
Watson the Supreme Court stated that granting a motion for a 
new trial does not necessarily need to involve setting aside 
the resolution of all the issues but can·be limited to 
reopening the case to just whatever extent the Court deems 
necessary and desirable in the interest of justice. In 
. Watson there was serious discrepancy as to the true value of 
the husband's investment in silver and turquoise Indian 
jewelry and to his income and.pensions. The Supreme Court 
Q 
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remanded the case for the purpose of giving both parties an 
opportunity to make further disclosures and for an opportunity 
to determine the actual value of these items. 
Our situation is parallel to Watson. The District 
Court failed to do equity in the case at hand. The Court 
may grant a motion for a new trial on the issues that were 
not resolved adequately at the District Court. Serious 
differences of opinion exist as to the actual value of the 
house. The Deiendant/Appellant desires to have an equitable 
distribution of the property. He, in good faith, feels that 
the house is worth less and that, in any event, the equity 
given to his wife was not in accordance with the amount 
contributed throughout the marriage or the house directly. 
Because of the serious discrepancies involved in this situation, 
the Appellant prays for relief and a re-trial to determine 
the value of the house. 
POINT III 
The Trial Court erred by awarding certain property to 
the Plaintiff and distributing the bills to the Lefendant 
for those items. Evidence showed that the Der(!Ill ant contributed 
$60,523.88 to the marriage exclusive of his $28,118.26 of 
the $36, 118. 26 down payment while the Plaintiff c:,dded $7, 728.13. 
The Court did not give adequate consiJeration to the fact 
that the Defendant made numerous payments to joirt debts 
during the course of the marriage before and afttr separation 
which reduced the joint obligations of the parths prior to 
trial. Because the Dc!fendant reduced the d(~bts on these 
certain items and no longer had the value or benefit from 
them, the Plaintiff should nov1 be required to take over 
payments on these~ itens or reimliucse Defendant. Just as the 
Court decided that the car which the Plaintiff and Defendant 
paid on while they were rnarri.ed went to the Plaint 1 i-f in the 
award, the Cou 1· t also decide<i tba t the payments W(n1 ld go 
along wLLli that ear. It would only be just and equit:abl_; 
1 ('\ 
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~: 
in this situation to allow the Plaintniff to pay for the 
items that she is getting the benefits of. The case should 
be remanded for this purpose also, particularly where the 
record shows Defendant did not agree to the distribution 
awarded and which the Court justified by finding the parties 
had agreed. Transcript page 82 line 12 to page 87 line 15. 
If it appears that a divorce decree is not an equitable 
allocation and is more likely to lead to further difficulties 
~nd distress than to serve the desired objective, then a 
reappraisal of the decree must be taken. Reed v. Reed, 594 
P2d 871 (Utah 1979). The Defendant in this situation cannot 
make payments on all the items the Plaintiff now has in her 
possession plus the excessive equity in the house. If a 
decree (divorce) causes financial distress, the ruling can 
be reviewed if within a year after the final judgment either 
party requests it. Klein v. Klein, 511 P2d 1284 (Utah 
1973). The Defendant is or will experience financial distress 
attempting to pay for several items the Plaintiff has in her 
possession plus the exorbitant amount of equity the Trial 
Court awarded to the Plaintiff in the house. Because of 
this financial distress, the Supreme Court should review the 
situation and grant relief to the Defendant/Appellant concerning 
the payments on items not now in his possession being enjoyed 
.by the Plaintiff/Respondent and the excessive amount of 
equity found in the house. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court particularly refused to make a finding 
of the value of the real property involved as was shown by 
the evidence believed by the Court at the trial. The Court 
refused to make a finding of the amount of money each party 
put into the house at the time the property was bought and 
11 
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refused to reflect the evidence introduced at the trial that 
the Plaintiff had contributed $8,000 and the Defendant had 
put in $28,.118.26 towards the down payment of the house. 
The Court also refused to take into account that the Defendant 
~ . . . 
had contributed $60,523.88 and the Plaintiff $7,728.13 to 
the marriage when it came to dividing up the furniture and 
debts and other items. The Court further refused to require 
the Plaintiff to return property removed to the premises 
prior to the entry of the order. The interlineated findings 
~and decree were entered March 26, 1980 without curing the 
enumerated deficiencies and some other things. 
The Trial Court erred when not allowing sufficient 
consideration of Defendant's evidence because of failure to 
file an answer in equity. The Court also erred because it 
did not apply reasonable means to determine the actual value 
of the home. The Court furt~er erred in awarding the Plaintiff 
several items that Defendant.was required to pay bills on 
without receiving benefit thereof and thereby creating 
financial difficulties for the Defendant. Because of the 
problems that have arisen in this case and because equity 
was not ~erved, Defendant prays for relief, reform and 
remanding of this case to the Trial Court to determine the 
value of the house in question and the equity of allowing 
the Plaintiff to have the benefits of items that Defendant 
must pay for. 
Plaintiff sued asking for distribution according to the 
contribution of each party. pefendant only sought that 
result in the hearing. The Court should have grant<:d the 
property distribution according to that scheme and should 
now be so ordered. 
12 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ~day of July, 1980. 
Raymond N. Malouf, For 
INS 
ys for Defendant, 
21 We t Center 
Logan, UT 84321 
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